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Response
Emily S. Rosenberg
Ernest Lefever, in a sweeping panorama, presents the post –
Cold War period as one more phase in an age-old struggle
between the forces of light and the forces of darkness. I will first
recapitulate his argument to highlight and critique its structure
and language and, then, propose some alternative perspectives
on post–Cold War global issues.
I. Lefever and the Ideology of “American Exceptionalism”
The two biggest threats to world peace, Dr. Lefever claims, are
crusading ideologies and “tribalism” in both the Third World
and in nonwhite America. (Laziness among these “tribal” peo-
ple also figures as a major problem.) Because he believes that
original sin means that “evil men” will always exploit ideologies
and “tribalism” to build their own tyrannical power, the U.S.
must stand vigilant, ready to do righteous battle. It must also be
vigilant against allowing internationalist bodies such as the UN
to promote illusions of cooperative paths to peace. In his view,
the UN is largely irrelevant to the maintenance of stability in the
world. In the end, he concludes, peace in the world system boils
down to character: conservative American thinkers, presum-
ably, have it; renegades and “mischief-makers” such as “Karl
Marx, Sigmund Freud, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre”
do not.
This portrait of a lone and benevolent U.S. battling clever
tyrants, tribalists, and civilization-wreckers has all the subtlety
of a Saturday morning cartoon show. From Buffalo Bill’s Wild
West show to Superman to Luke Skywalker, this caricature of
foreign affairs has too long infused our podiums and popular
attitudes. Although Dr. Lefever declares that “nineteenth-cen-
tury imperialism is a spent force,” it appears that the kind of
rhetoric that gave it justification — rhetoric pitting the forces of
progress and the Christian work ethic against the forces of the
backward, the lazy, and the freedom-hating — continues to live
in his colorful phrases.
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Ernest Lefever has given us all of the time-worn clichés of the
attitude that American historians call “exceptionalism.” Ameri-
can exceptionalism is a long-studied constellation of beliefs with
deep roots in American popular culture and attitudes, stretching
back to the colonial period. It places America above, or outside
of, history and ideology.1 Common to the exceptionalist view of
American history is a Manichaean analysis of good and evil.
America is synonymous with inevitable progress, with effi-
ciency and energy, with civilization, and with divine guidance.
The opposing side — and foes have changed in every era,
although their cultural constructions have remained remarkably
stable—is drawn as the embodiment of evil and/or of backward
degeneracy, laziness, and tribalism. Other people are motivated
by “ideologies.” (In typically exceptionalist terms, Dr. Lefever
incorrectly defines the term “ideology” as a distorted belief sys-
tem rather than simply as any belief system. Exceptionalism, of
course, is also an ideology, and frequently a crusading one as
well.) Americans, by contrast, are unsullied by “ideology” but
simply express universal truths. Standing outside of history,
America is the virtuous condition to which all others aspire. (Dr.
Lefever, on this point, follows the usual exceptionalist practice
of citing high immigration figures as proof of this superior con-
dition even though immigration historians have long agreed
that the vast majority of immigrants came intending not to stay
but to return home when the conditions that drove them to the
U.S. improved.)
Dr. Lefever, thus, has chosen the standard villains to play
opposite America’s exceptional righteousness and the standard
plot line that confirms America’s special superiority. In his for-
mulation of American exceptionalism, we may be sure that the
cavalry — and probably even the Calvary — will be summoned
at the end.
Scores of scholars over the years—conservative as well as lib-
eral—have done their best to dissect and debunk such formula-
tions of exceptionalism. In fact, a review of a recent book about
the tradition of American exceptionalism points out that very
few historians still write from the standpoint of exceptionalist
beliefs.2 Why? Because exceptionalist attitudes, in the name of
pride and patriotism, promote intolerance and subjugation. In
the nineteenth century, when exceptionalism waxed in its fullest
Macalester International Vol. 1
108
04/18/95  9:15 PM      1833ros.qxd
04/18/95  9:15 PM      1833ros.qxd
form, it infused the policies of Manifest Destiny, of the race wars
on the frontier that nearly extinguished an entire people, and of
the turn-of-the-century imperialism that forcibly annexed the
Philippines and Puerto Rico and made protectorates out of
Panama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Liberia, and
Haiti.3
Of course, the alternative to casting the United States as ever-
infused with divine purpose and uplift should not be simply to
reverse the casting and present United States policy as perpetu-
ally villainous. Ironically, exceptionalist rhetoric has often
dialectically evoked that kind of self-hating reversal. The more
appropriate alternative would be to see the United States as one
among many nations, each with different qualities, but none as
the inevitable measure of either human progress or depravity.
This alternative perspective would place the United States
within history, not as the culmination of it.
II. Security Issues in the Post–Cold War World
Dr. Lefever’s answer to “How new is the new world order?” is,
in effect, not new at all. I propose a more future-oriented
answer, rooted not in the stale, ethnocentric discourses of nine-
teenth-century exceptionalism but in the understandings of a
world whose cultures and structures are being swept by change.
For guidance in thinking about the post–Cold War international
order, I would like to advance some alternative propositions to
those suggested by Dr. Lefever.
• The effort to universalize one’s own values by demonizing
the ideas or cultures of others is a profound cause of global
discord. People acting out of a presumed divine calling and
conviction of superior virtue — from the Spanish Inquisition
to Hitler’s Aryan fantasies; from the American frontier to the
massacres of Armenians, Kurds, and Bosnians—are seldom a
force for peace, unless it is the peace that comes through the
final silencing of opponents.
• Today’s financial and communications revolutions, together
with the accelerating flows of refugees and immigrants, are
mixing cultures together to create a profound transformation
in global affairs. This great and unprecedented intercultural
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mixing, by enhancing awareness of cultural “difference,” will
promote greater pride in one’s own particular heritage. Dr.
Lefever appallingly calls this development “tribalism,”
apparently without recognizing that his own assertion of
pride in tradition is part of the same historic process that he
disparages in others. These new transcultural forces and eth-
nic identifications that crosscut national boundaries will chal-
lenge the old nation-state system in ways that will require
some reworking of traditional balance-of-power theories and
traditional conceptions of nationhood.
• As political entities correspond less and less neatly to eco-
nomic and cultural divisions, ideas about national or interna-
tional security take on new meanings. Threats may not
always come from other nation-states but from the interwo-
ven problems of environmental peril, the pressures of popula-
tion on development, and international actors operating
outside of any nation-state system. The prescription to stand
tough against devilish foes on the model of Hitler or Stalin
provides us with little guidance, for example, as to how to
police the proliferation of enriched uranium; promote the lit-
eracy and reproductive choices for women that will amelio-
rate population pressures; move against the new international
crime syndicates that specialize in kidnapping, extortion, and
drugs; solve the dilemmas of the rising numbers of refugees
worldwide; or ameliorate the presence of toxic chemicals in
our oceans and soils. These are the things that most gravely
threaten the security of people — Americans and non-Ameri-
cans — who will live in the next century. Nineteenth-century-
style shibboleths of nation-state exceptionalism and
tough-guy frontier attitudes make for dramatic plots, but they
do not even address, much less solve, today’s national secu-
rity issues.
Dr. Lefever’s prescriptions take us back to the future rather
than forward. For many Americans, these old faiths in Amer-
ica’s exceptional virtue, dressed up and labeled “values,” can
provide solace, familiarity, and self-congratulation — all things
for which people yearn in this unstable world — but I would
urge this forum to push toward transcending the formulas of
American exceptionalism, not repeating them.
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Notes
1. A recent analysis may be found in Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in
an Age of International History,” American Historical Review 96 (1991): 1031–55.
2. Robert Middlekauff, “The Sources of American Exceptionalism,” Reviews in
American History 22 (1994): 387.
3. The long tradition of historical writings that critique the exceptionalist
assumptions of Manifest Destiny include Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny:
A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1935); Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in Ameri-
can History: A Reinterpretation (New York: Knopf, 1963); Richard Drinnon, Fac-
ing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-hating and Empire-building (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Design: Anx-
ious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America (New York: Cornell University
Press, 1985).
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